Providence

Literally means foresight, but is generally used to denote God's preserving and governing all things by means of second causes (Ps. 18:35; 63:8; Acts 17:28; Col. 1:17; Heb. 1:3). God's providence extends to the natural world (Ps. 104:14; 135:5-7; Acts 14:17), the brute creation (Ps. 104:21-29; Matt. 6:26; 10:29), and the affairs of men (1 Chr. 16:31; Ps. 47:7; Prov. 21:1; Job 12:23; Dan. 2:21; 4:25), and of individuals (1 Sam. 2:6; Ps. 18:30; Luke 1:53; James 4:13-15). It extends also to the free actions of men (Ex. 12:36; 1 Sam. 24:9-15; Ps. 33:14, 15; Prov. 16:1; 19:21; 20:24; 21:1), and things sinful (2 Sam. 16:10; 24:1; Rom. 11:32; Acts 4:27, 28), as well as to their good actions (Phil. 2:13; 4:13; 2 Cor. 12:9, 10; Eph. 2:10; Gal. 5:22-25). As regards sinful actions of men, they are represented as occurring by God's permission (Gen. 45:5; 50:20. Comp. 1 Sam. 6:6; Ex. 7:13; 14:17; Acts 2:3; 3:18; 4:27, 28), and as controlled (Ps. 76:10) and overruled for good (Gen. 50:20; Acts 3:13). God does not cause or approve of sin, but only limits, restrains, overrules it for good. The mode of God's providential government is altogether unexplained. We only know that it is a fact that God does govern all his creatures and all their actions; that this government is universal (Ps. 103:17-19), particular (Matt. 10:29-31), efficacious (Ps. 33:11; Job 23:13), embraces events apparently contingent (Prov. 16:9, 33; 19:21; 21:1), is consistent with his own perfection (2 Tim. 2:13), and to his own glory (Rom. 9:17; 11:36).

the conduct and direction of the several parts of the universe, by a superior intelligent Being. The notion of a providence is founded upon this truth, that the Creator has not so fixed and ascertained the laws of nature, nor so connected the chain of second causes, as to leave the world to itself, but that he still preserves the reins in his own hands, and occasionally intervenes, alters, restrains, enforces, suspends, &c, those laws by a particular providence. Some use the word _providence_ in a more general sense, signifying by it that power or action by which the several parts of the creation are ordinarily directed. Thus Damascenus defines providence to be that divine will by which all things are ordered and directed to the proper end: which notion of providence supposes no laws at all fixed by the author of nature at the creation, but that he reserved it at large, to be governed by himself immediately. The Epicureans denied any divine providence, as thinking it inconsistent with the ease and repose of the divine nature to meddle at all with human affairs. Simplicius argues thus for a providence: If God does not look to the affairs of the world, it is either because he cannot or will not; but the first is absurd, since, to govern cannot be difficult where to create was easy; and the latter is both absurd and blasphemous. In Plato’s Tenth Dialogue of Laws, he teaches excellently, that (since what is self-moving is, by its nature, before that which moves only in consequence of being moved) mind must be prior to matter, and the cause of all its modifications and changes; and that, therefore, there is a universal Mind possessed of all perfection, which produced and which actuates all things. After this he shows that the Deity exercises a particular providence over the world, taking care of small no less than great things. In proving this he observes “that a superior nature of such excellence as the divine, which hears, sees, and knows all things, cannot, in any instance, be subject to negligence or sloth; that the meanest and the greatest part of the world are all equally his work or possession; that great things cannot be rightly taken care of without taking care of small; and that, in all cases, the more able and perfect any artist is, (as a physician, an architect, or the ruler of the state,) the more his skill and care appear in little as well as great things. Let us not, then,” says he, “conceive of God as worse than even mortal artists.” The term providence, in its primary signification, simply denotes foresight; and if we allow the existence of a supreme Being who formed the universe at first, we must necessarily allow that he has a perfect foresight of every event which at any time takes place in the natural or moral world. Matter can have no motion, nor spirit any energy, but what is derived from him; nor can he be ignorant of the effects which they will, either separately or conjointly, produce. A common mechanic has knowledge of the work of his own hands: when he puts the machine which he has made in motion, he foresees how long it will go, and what will be the state and position of its several parts at any particular point of time; or, if he is not perfectly able to do this, it is because he is not perfectly acquainted with all the powers of the materials which he has used in its construction: they are not of his making, and they may therefore have qualities which he does not understand, and consequently cannot regulate. But in the immense machine of the universe there is nothing except that which God has made; all the powers and properties, relations and dependencies, which created things have, they have, both in kind and degree, from him. Nothing, therefore, it should seem, can come to pass at any time, or in any part of the universe, which its incomprehensible Architect did not, from the moment his almighty fiat called it into existence, clearly foresee. The providence of God is implied in his very existence as an intelligent Creator; and it imports not only an abstract foresight of all possible events, but such a predisposition of causes and effects, such an adjustment of means and ends, as seems to us to exclude that contingency of human actions with which, as expectants of positive rewards and punishments in another world, we firmly believe it to be altogether consistent. By providence we may understand, not merely foresight, but a uniform and constant operation of God subsequent to the act of creation. Thus, in every machine formed by human ingenuity, there is a necessity for the action of some extraneous power to put the machine in motion: a proper construction and disposition of parts not being sufficient to effect the end: there must be a spring, or a weight, or an impulse of air or water, or some substance or other, on which the motion of the several parts of the machine must depend. In like manner, the machine of the universe depends upon its Creator for the commencement and the conservation of the motion of its several parts. The power by which the insensible particles of matter coalesce into sensible lumps, as well as that by which the great orbs of the universe are reluctantly, as it were, retained in their courses, admits not an explanation from mechanical causes: the effects of both of them are different from such as mere matter and motion can produce; they must ultimately be referred to God. Vegetable and animal life and increase cannot be accounted for, without recurring to him as the primary cause of both. In all these respects the providence of God is something more than foresight; it is a continual influence, a universal agency; “by him all things consist,” and “in him we live, and move, and have our being.” Much labour has been employed to account for all the phenomena of nature by the powers of mechanism, or the necessary laws of matter and motion. But this, as we imagine, cannot be done. The primary causes of things must certainly be some powers and principles not mechanical, otherwise we shall be reduced to the necessity of maintaining an endless progression of motions communicated from matter to matter, without any first mover; or of saying that the first impelling matter moved itself. The former is an absurdity too great to be embraced by any one; and there is reason to hope that the essential inactivity of matter is at present so well understood, and so generally allowed, notwithstanding some modern oppugners of this hypothesis, that there can be but few who will care to assert the latter. All our reasonings about bodies, and the whole of natural philosophy, are founded on the three laws of motion laid down by Sir Isaac Newton, at the beginning of the “_Principia_.” These laws express the plainest truths; but they would have neither evidence nor meaning, were not inactivity contained in our idea of matter. Should it be said that matter, though naturally inert, may be made to be otherwise by divine power, this would be the same with saying that matter may be made not to be matter. If inactivity belong to it at all, it must belong to it as matter, or solid extension, and therefore must be inseparable from it. Matter is figured, movable, discerptable, inactive, and capable of communicating motion by impulse to other matter: these are not accidental but primary qualities of matter. Beside, matter void of inactivity, if we were to suppose it possible, could produce no effects. The communication of motion, its direction, the resistance it suffers, and its cessation, in a word, the whole doctrine of motion cannot be consistently explained or clearly understood without supposing the inertia of matter. Self-moving matter must have thought and design, because, whenever matter moves, it must move in some particular direction, and with some precise degree of velocity; and as there is an infinity of these equally possible, it cannot move itself without selecting one of these preferably to and exclusively of all others, and therefore not without design. Moreover, it may be plainly proved that matter cannot be the ultimate cause of the phenomena of nature, or the agent which, by any powers inherent in itself, produces the general laws of nature, without possessing the highest degree of knowledge and wisdom; which might be easily evinced or exemplified by adverting to the particular law of gravitation. “The philosopher,” says an excellent writer, “who overlooks the laws of an all-governing Deity in nature, contenting himself with the appearance of the material universe only, and the mechanical laws of motion, neglects what is most excellent, and prefers what is imperfect to what is supremely perfect, finitude to infinity, what is narrow and weak to what is unlimited and almighty, and what is perishing to what endures for ever. Sir Isaac Newton thought it most unaccountable to exclude the Deity _only_ out of the universe. It appeared to him much more just and reasonable to suppose that the whole chain of causes, or the several series of them, should centre in him as their source; and the whole system appear depending on him the only independent cause.” If, then, the Deity pervades and actuates the material world, and his unremitting energy is the cause to which every effect in it must be traced; the spiritual world, which is of greater consequence, cannot be disregarded by him. Is there not one atom of matter on which he does not act; and is there one living being about which he has no concern? Does not a stone fall without him; and does, then, a man suffer without him? The inanimate world is of no consequence, abstracted from its subserviency to the animate and reasonable world: the former, therefore, must be preserved and governed entirely with a view to the latter. But it is not mere energy or the constant exertion of power that is discernible in the frame or laws of the universe, in maintaining the succession of men, and in producing men and other beings; but wisdom and skill are also conspicuous in the structure of every object in the inanimate creation. After a survey of the beauty and elegance of the works of nature, aided by the perusal of Matt. vi, 28, &c, we may ask ourselves, Has God, in the lowest of his works, been lavish of wisdom, beauty, and skill; and is he sparing of these in the concerns of reasonable beings? Or does he less regard order, propriety, and fitness in the determination of their states? The answer is obvious. Providence also implies a particular interposition of God in administering the affairs of individuals and nations, and wholly distinct from that general and incessant exertion of his power, by which he sustains the universe in existence. The doctrine of providence may be evinced from the consideration of the divine perfections. The first cause of all things must be regarded as a being absolutely perfect; and the idea of absolute perfection comprehends infinite power, wisdom, and goodness; hence we deduce the doctrine of providence. The Deity cannot be an indifferent spectator of the series of events in that world to which he has given being. His goodness will as certainly engage him to direct them agreeably to the ends of goodness, as his wisdom and power enable him to do it in the most effectual manner. This conclusion is conformable to all our ideas of those attributes. Could we call that being good who would refuse to do any good which he is able to do without the least labour or difficulty? God is present every where. He sees all that happens, and it is in his power, with perfect ease, to order all for the best. Can he then possess goodness, and at the same time not do this? A God without a providence is undoubtedly a contradiction. Nothing is plainer than that a being of perfect reason will, in every instance, take such care of the universe as perfect reason requires. That supreme intelligence and love, which are present to all things, and from whence all things sprung, must govern all occurrences. These considerations prove what has been called a _particular_, in opposition to a _general_, providence. We cannot conceive of any reasons that can influence the Deity to exercise _any_ providence over the world, which are not likewise reasons for extending it to _all_ that happens in the world. As far as it is confined to generals, or overlooks _any_ individual, or _any_ event, it is incomplete, and therefore unsuitable to the idea of a perfect being. One common prejudice against this doctrine arises from the apprehension that it is below the dignity of the Deity to watch over, in the manner implied in it, the meanest beings, and the minutest affairs. To which it may be replied, that a great number of minute affairs, if they are each of them of some consequence, make up a sum which is of great consequence; and that there is no way of taking care of this sum, without taking care of each particular. This objection, therefore, under the appearance of honouring God, plainly dishonours him. Nothing is absolutely trifling in which the happiness of any individual, even the most insignificant, is at all concerned; nor is it beneath a wise and good being to interpose in any thing of this kind. To suppose the Deity above this, is to suppose him above acting up to the full extent of goodness and rectitude. The same eternal benevolence that first engaged him to produce beings, must also engage him to exercise a particular providence over them; and the very lowest beings, as well as the highest, seem to have a kind of right to his superintendence, from the act itself of bringing them into existence. Every apprehension that this is too great a condescension in him is founded on the poorest ideas; for, surely, whatever it was not too great condescension in him to create, it cannot be too great a condescension in him to take care of. Beside, with regard to God, all distinctions in the creation vanish. All beings are infinitely, that is, equally, inferior to him. Accident, and chance, and fortune, are words which we often hear mentioned, and much is ascribed to them in the life of man. But they are words without meaning; or, as far as they have any signification, they are no other than names for the unknown operations of providence; for it is certain that in God’s universe nothing comes to pass causelessly, or in vain. Every event has its own determined direction. That chaos of human affairs and intrigues where we can see no light, that mass of disorder and confusion which they often present to our view, is all clearness and order in the sight of Him who is governing and directing the whole, and bringing forward every event in its due time and place. “The Lord sitteth on the flood. The Lord maketh the wrath of man to praise him,” as he maketh the “hail and rain to obey his word. He hath prepared his throne in the heavens; and his kingdom ruleth over all. A man’s heart deviseth his way, but the Lord directeth his steps.” No other principle than this, embraced with a steady faith, and attended with a suitable practice, can ever be able to give repose and tranquillity to the mind; to animate our hopes, or extinguish our fears; to give us any true satisfaction in the enjoyments of life, or to minister consolation under its adversities. If we are persuaded that God governs the world, that he has the superintendence and direction of all events, and that we are the objects of his providential care; whatever may be our distress or our danger, we can never want consolation; we may always have a fund of hope, always a prospect of relief. But take away this hope and this prospect, take away the belief of God and of a superintending providence, and man would be of all creatures the most miserable; destitute of every comfort, every support, under present sufferings, and of every security against future dangers.